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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
U S WEST Communications, Inc. does not object to the jurisdiction of the
Utah Supreme Court to hear this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Should Pickett v. California Pacific Utilities. 619 P.2d 325 (Utah
1980), be overruled?
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness. See Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198 (Utah
1991)

II.

Should the rule in Pickett v. California Pacific Utilities. 619 P.2d 325
(Utah 1980), be applied to the installation of sewer lines and other
utility facilities beneath public road rights-of-way?
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness. See Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198 (Utah
1991)
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
There are no determinative

constitutional

provisions,

statutes,

ordinances, or rules.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
U S WEST Communications,

Inc. accepts the Appellant's

Respondents' statements regarding the nature of the case.

and

R

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
U S WEST Communications,

Inc. accepts the Appellant's

and

Respondents* statements regarding the course of proceedings.
C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
U S WEST Communications,

Inc. accepts the Appellant's

and

Respondents' statements regarding the disposition at trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
U S WEST Communications,

Inc. accepts the Appellant's

and

Respondents' statements regarding the facts of the case.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Pickett v. California Pacific Utilities. 619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980)

should not be overruled, because it was correctly decided and represents the
position of the majority of other jurisdictions that have considered the issue in
more recent years. Pickett is consistent with the principle that public roads
are for the transportation of people and products, without unreasonable
restriction on the means of transportation, and that transportation of utility
products is a natural and expected incidental use of public roads that does not
impose any additional burden or servitude on the interest of adjoining
landowners.

Furthermore, it would cause great disruption and unnecessary

expense to public utilities if Pickett were overruled, in order to defend and pay
judgments in trespass and inverse condemnation suits that would likely ensue,

2

which costs and expenses would be passed on to utility ratepayers in the form
of higher rates.
2.

The underlying philosophy of Pickett that "uses of a public highway

are expansive and are not confined to uses either permitted or contemplated at
the time of dedication but are extended to new uses, consistent and proper, as
civilization advances," 619 P.2d at 327, requires that its holding be applied
equally to all public utility facilities placed in public road rights-of-way,
including both above-ground facilities, such as poles and wires, and
underground facilities, such as pipelines for water, sewer, and natural gas, and
cables and other appurtenances for the transmission of electricity and
telecommunications.

ARGUMENT
L

INTRODUCTION
Pickett v. California Pacific Utilities. 619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980) was

decided correctly and wisely, because it recognizes that the purpose of public
roadways is the transportation of people and products in the broad sense,
without historical or unreasonable limitations on the particular means of
transportation. There is no sound reason to distinguish between transportation
by motor vehicle and transportation by other means, nor between products that
are typically carried by motor vehicle and those that are conveyed by other
means.

Because modern technology provides means of transporting certain

3

products more efficiently than transportation by vehicle, public utilities
prudently transport their products by such other means. 1 While each of those
products could theoretically be conveyed by vehicular traffic^ it would
repudiate modern technology and efficiency to so restrict the mode of
transportation. The concept of modern transportation is not and should not be
confined to notions of vehicular conveyance. It would be as overly narrow and
anachronistic to argue that products may be transported only by horse drawn
wagons, but not by motor vehicles, railroads, and airplanes, as to argue that
utility products may not be transported along public thoroughfares by the most
efficient means available. 3
As to the argument that an additional "burden" is imposed when utilities
are permitted to transport their products beneath the public roadways,
Appellant has not explained, and it is submitted, cannot explain, in what way its
use or enjoyment of its property is further diminished by the presence of

1

For example, electricity is transported over metallic wires; natural gas, water and sewage
are transported through pipes; and communications are transported by various modes, including metallic
wires, fiber-optic cables, and microwave.
2
For example, electric energy can be stored and transported in batteries; natural gas, water
and sewage can be stored and transported in tanks; and communications can be recorded mechanically
(on paper) or electronically (on magnetic tape, compact disc, etc.) and thus transported by vehicle. The
absurdity of such modes of transporting utility products is an argument for recognizing their traditional
means of transportation as natural, incidental uses of public highways.
3
Even where a public road is established by user, and therefore may be in the nature of a
prescriptive right, see Pickett. 619 P.2d at 326, 329, it would be unduly restrictive to hold that future use
of the road is limited to the "use made during the prescriptive period." McBride v. McBride. 581 P.2d 996
(Utah 1978). Under such a narrow view, a road that was originally established by use of horse and wagon
could never be used by automobiles, motorcycles, trucks, vans, buses, farm equipment, etc., and all their
variations, without condemning a new easement or establishing a new period of adverse public use by
each new form of transportation that might be invented.

4

utilities beneath the surface of a road.*

The presence of the road itself

precludes further use of the surface. With respect to the potential use of the
land beneath the surface (e.g. for extraction of minerals, etc.), it is submitted
that the landowner could not make use of the few feet beneath the surface that
are occupied by utility facilities, because doing so would destroy the subjacent
support required for the road itself.
Because it is virtually impossible to identify a real, additional detriment to
a landowner from the presence of utility facilities beneath a public road,s it is
equally impossible to ascertain the fair market value of an additional easement
for such facilities, because there is no real "market" for such easements. 6 Thus
even if a landowner were theoretically entitled to compensation for such
additional facilities, the amount of compensation would be determined only by
resort to speculation, chance, or the influence of prejudice against the utility.
Aside from the cost to society from such misuse of the judicial system, that is
hardly a sound basis on which to allow a landowner to be compensated for the

4

The facts of the present case make a stronger argument for the rule of Pickett than do the
facts of Pickett themselves. In Pickett, it could have been argued that the presence of poles and wires
above ground at least impaired the landowner's visual enjoyment of his property. In the present case, and
in all instances where the utility facilities are buried beneath the surface of the road, no such argument
could be made.
5
With respect to the argument that utility facilities increase the risk of damage to the
landowner's adjacent property (e.g. from a ruptured sewer line), it is submitted that the Appellant has an
adequate remedy for such damages, just as it would have a remedy for a toxic chemical spill from a vehicle
on the road. There is no evidence that such a risk is any greater for transportation of products through a
pipeline than by means of vehicles.
6

It would be much easier to determine the value of the benefit to the landowner from the
availability of utility products, and in most cases the benefit would clearly outweigh the detriment to the
land. (In a condemnation setting, the law requires damages to be offset by the benefits conferred. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10(4).)

5

additional "servitude" of utility facilities beneath a public road.
The concept of stare decisis applies particularly to this case, because of
the tremendous impact that overruling Pickett would have on all utilities. U S
WEST Communications, for example, has in place literally thousands of miles of
communications lines in public road rights-of-way throughout the State of Utah.
Those lines were placed in reliance on the principle enunciated in Pickett,
pursuant to permits obtained from the governmental agencies responsible for
the roads, and not pursuant to separate easements. If Pickett were overruled,
all of the owners of land subject to those road rights-of-way would then be able
to claim that U S WEST Communications was in trespass, and to claim
compensation in inverse condemnation actions. The mere cost of defending
such claims would be staggering, to say nothing of the potential damages that
might be awarded. Eventually, those costs and damages would be passed on to
all rate-payers (who are, coincidentally, most of the citizens of the State), in
the form of higher rates. The result would be multiplied by the number of
public utilities that similarly had facilities beneath public roads. Thus public
policy weighs heavily in favor of retaining the rule of Pickett.
U S WEST Communications, Inc. endorses the well-reasoned and wellsupported arguments of Respondents and other Amici Curiae in this case, and
submits the following additional points and authorities for the Court's
consideration.

6

n.

CASE LAW SUPPORTS PICKETT.
The Brief of Broadbent Land Company ("Broadbent") seeks to give the

impression that the rule in Pickett has only weak support in the case law.
However, more careful examination reveals that Pickett is well within the
mainstream of contemporary decisions. While most of the cases relied on by
Broadbent are more than 50 years old, most of the more recent decisions
support the rule in Pickett.? Furthermore, all of the jurisdictions in reasonable
proximity to Utah have that have considered the issue (Idaho, Montana, New
Mexico, and Washington) have adopted the rule in Pickett.s In addition to the
cases cited in Pickett itself and in Mountain Fuel Supply Company's Brief, the
following cases also support Pickett:
In Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. Kellv. 93 Idaho 226, 459
P.2d 349 (1969), the court affirmed a summary judgment restraining

7
Broadbent relies on the cases cited in Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 525 (1958). Attached
hereto as Addendum A is an analysis of the cases cited in that article. It shows that many of
the jurisdictions that have held that power lines are not ipso facto within a road right-of-way
have not even addressed the issue since before 1920. All of the cases since 1960 that are cited in
the article support the rule of Pickett.
Exhibit "A" to Broadbent's Brief seeks to update the cases in Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 525
(1958). However, that survey demonstrates that a significant majority of the jurisdictions that
have addressed the issue since 1970 have sided with the rule in Pickett. Cases in nine
jurisdictions have supported Pickett since 1970, while only five jurisdictions have announced
a contrary rule. Even Broadbent admits that some jurisdictions (e.g. Michigan, Montana and
Pennsylvania) have defected to the Pickett side, and others have joined Pickett on first
impression (e.g. Alaska, Idaho, and New Hampshire). However, it fails to acknowledge that no
Jurisdiction has newly adopted a position contrary to Pickett since before the A.L.R. article
first appeared in 1958. Furthermore, the contrary rule appears to be eroding in at least two of
the jurisdictions that previously endorsed it (Mississippi and Texas). An analysis of
Broadbent's Exhibit "A* is attached hereto as Addendum B.
8
See Amerada Hess Corp. v. Adee. 106 N.M. 422, 744 P.2d 550 (N.M. App. 1987),
cert denied, 106 N.M. 405, 744 P.2d 180 (1987); Bentel v. County of Bannock. 104 Idaho 130, 656
P.2d 1383 (1983); Bolinger v. Citv of Bozeman. 158 Mont. 507, 493 P.2d 1062 (1972); State ex rel.
Yorkv. Board of Commissioners of Walla Walla County. 28 Wash. 2d 891, 184 P.2d 577 (1947).

7

defendants from hindering Mountain Bell's efforts to remove its facilities,
which were placed on a highway right-of-way. The court stated:
This Court . . . held that the portion of highway right-of-way in
controversy here not used for actual road purposes is not forfeited
to the owner of the fee title. The telephone company had the clear
legal right to place and maintain their facilities upon the highway
right-of-way . . . and such facilities impose no additional burden for
which the owner of the fee is entitled to compensation. United
States v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co., 318 U.S. 206, 63 S.Ct.
534, 87 L.Ed. 716 (1943).
459 P.2d at 349.
In Bentel v. County of Bannock. 104 Idaho 130, 656 P.2d 1383 (1983),
the court reaffirmed the position taken in Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph v. Kelly. 93 Idaho 226, 459 P.2d 349 (1969) in a situation involving a
permit to construct a waste water transmission pipeline under a prescriptive
highway right-of-way, citing Pickett with approval:
In more contemporary decisions, other jurisdictions have held the
scope of such easements comprehensive enough to include
reasonably foreseeable public uses of such roadways, such as
subsurface installations for sewage, runoff, communications and
other services necessary to the increased quality of life which
generally accompanies the growth of civilization.
656 P.2d at 1386. The Idaho court also quoted from Yale University v. City of
New Haven. 104 Conn. 610, 134 A. 268, 271 (1926) as follows:
The early common law conception of the extent of this public
easement has grown with the public necessity to include, not only
the surface and a depth sufficient to make and keep the surface in
proper condition for travel, but so much of the highway beneath the
surface as is required for public purposes, such as the laying of
sewers, catch basins, water, gas, electricity, and telephone and
telegraph wires. . . . None of these uses of the surface above or
beneath the highway add a new servitude to the highway, or
interfere, practically, with a fee of the abutter in the highway.

8

[quoted in Bentel. 656 P.2d at 1387]
In Fisher v. Golden Vallev Electric Association. 658 P.2d 127 (Alaska
1983), the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the utility's right to construct a power
line on an unused section line easement reserved for highway purposes.

In

adopting the Pickett rule, the court stated:
The fact that the section line easement was not actually used for
highway purposes does not dictate a different result. Since a
highway could be built, a power line, which is a subordinate and
less intrusive use, may be.
658 P.2d at 130. See also, In re Grand River Dam Authority. 484 P.2d 505
(Okla. 1971).
In Deetz v. Northern Indiana Fuel and Light Co.. Inc.. 545 N.E.2d 1103
(Ind. 1989), the court affirmed a summary judgment allowing a public utility to
install an underground gas pipeline within a public road right-of-way without
having to obtain the abutting landowners* consent, where the landowners
claimed that such use was an additional burden and servitude to the fee.
In Eyde Bros. Development Co. v. Eaton County Drain Commissioner. 398
N.W.2d 297 (Mich. 1986), the court held that the scope of the public's
easement in a highway dedicated by user included access to the subsurface for
construction of a sewer system, and that such a system could be installed
without the landowner's consent, and without having to compensate the
landowner.

In that case, the landowner had specifically argued that the

easement was limited to surface transportation because it was an easement by
user. The court rejected that notion, stating:
In [Cleveland v. Detroit. 324 Mich. 527, 37 N.W.2d 625 (1949)],
9

expanding the scope of a public highway easement to include
subsurface parking garages was a natural consequence that
answered a definite public need and generated a definite public
benefit. . . . Thus, the Cleveland case is persuasive support for our
holding that construction of a sewer within the subsurface of a
highway easement is a proper and contemplated public use of the
easement
For these reasons, we hold that a public easement in
a highway dedicated by user is not limited to surface travel, but
includes those uses, such as the installation of sewers,
contemplated to be in the public interest and for the public benefit.
398 N.W.2d at 304.
In King v. Town of Lyme. 490 A.2d 1369 (N.H. 1985), the court, analyzing
the application of a statute (similar to Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-5-39 and 27-12134) that authorized the installation of utility facilities in any public highway,
held that installation of power lines in a rural highway "does not constitute an
additional servitude which would require the payment of damages to abutting
landowners. n 490 A.2d at 1373. In addition, the court stated: "In this state
we have never considered a highway purpose to be limited solely to the
transportation of persons and property on the highways. n Id.
Similarly, in Harmon v. Phillips Petroleum Co.. 555 F. Supp. 447 (D.
Mont. 1982), the court held that construction of a natural gas pipeline in a
public road was authorized without compensation to the landowner, even
though the owner of the pipeline was not a public utility and the natural gas
would not be used by the citizens of Montana.
In Davis v. South Central Bell Telephone Co.. 480 F. Supp. 826 (1979),

10

the court, construing Mississippi law.Q held that a telephone utility could place
its facilities in a public right-of-way, subject to its liability to the landowner for
actual damages. The court stated:
[T]he Mississippi rule is that when a landowner or his predecessor
has granted a right-of-way to the State Highway Commission, public
utilities have the right to use and occupy the right-of way with their
facilities, but subject to liability for actual damages to the abutting
property, if there are any such damages. However, a landowner
cannot compel the removal of the facilities and cannot recover
rental or compensation for the use of the right-of-way by public
utilities.
480 F. Supp. at 829.
In summary, Pickett does not stand alone, nor is its support in other
jurisdictions weak.

Numerous courts have held that placement of utility

facilities in a public road does not impose an additional burden on the adjoining
landowner, and does not entitle the landowner to any compensation for the
taking of an additional easement.
HI.

THE RULE IN PICKETT SHOULD BE APPLIED TO UNDERGROUND
UTILITY FACILITIES IN PUBLIC ROAD RIGHTS-OF-WAY.
Broadbent argues in the alternative that Pickett should be strictly limited

to its holding that "the construction and maintenance of an electric power or
transmission line, within the boundaries of a public highway, are consistent
with the permissible uses to be made of a public highway easement and do not
constitute an additional burden or servitude."

619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980).

9
In Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 525 (1958), Mississippi is cited as a jurisdiction that
subscribes to the view that power lines are within a street or highway easement only where
they furnish power for use directly related to travel, such as street lamps. Davis seems to
indicate that such a rule no longer applies in Mississippi.

11

Broadbent does not explain why the erection of electric poles and lines above
ground is less intrusive, or more in the public interest, than the construction
and operation of underground utility facilities, specifically in this case a sewer
line.

Similarly, Broadbent h a s failed to explain how the presence of

underground utility facilities increases the burden on its land, makes it more
difficult to use, or diminishes its value. The truth is that utilities generally have
the opposite effect; that is, land with utilities available may be developed more
readily and for a wider variety of purposes, and hence is more valuable, than
land without utilities nearby.
The underlying philosophy of Pickett makes clear that "uses of a public
highway are expansive and are not confined to uses either permitted or
contemplated at the time of dedication but are expanded to new uses,
consistent and proper, as civilization advances/ 619 P.2d at 327. The cases
cited in Point I, supra,

illustrate that courts are willing to permit the

installation of underground utility facilities, even though they were probably not
specifically contemplated when the road in question was dedicated to public
use. The reason is that roadways are for the purpose of public transportation,
without artificial restrictions on the mode of transportation.

Because

technology has developed means of placing utility facilities beneath the surface
of the ground efficiently and safely [e.g. through widespread use of earth
moving equipment, pipelines, and insulated electrical and telecommunications
cable that can operate well for many years without exposure to the elements or
other above-ground risks), it is only prudent that such means of transporting

12

utility products be employed in the public roads. Indeed, such uses are just as
natural and incidental uses of roads in today's environment as were poles and
wires in earlier times. There is simply no good policy reason to permit aboveground utility facilities to be placed in public roads, but not underground
facilities.

Hence Pickett should be held applicable to all utility facilities in

public road rights-of-way.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed in the foregoing argument, Pickett should not
be overruled.

Rather, it should be applied to permit utility facilities to be

placed in and under public road rights-of-way as natural incidental uses of the
roadway for the transportation of commonly used utility products. That public
interest, coupled with the benefit that utilities usually provide to the adjoining
land, and the extreme difficulty of determining a meaningful fair market value
of an additional easement for utilities in a public road, compel the conclusion
that utilities in a public road are not an additional burden to the servient estate.
The lower court's decision should, therefore, be affirmed.
Dated this 25th day of October, 1991.
U S WEST Communications, Inc.

13

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that on this 25th day of October, 1991, I caused four
copies of the foregoing Amicus Curiae Brief of U S WEST Communications, Inc.
to be mailed by United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Lewis T. Stevens
Kristin G. Brewer
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS
215 South State Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

Blaine Benard
HALEY & STOLEBARGER
175 S. Main #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Snyderville
Sewer Improvement District

Gayle F. McKeachnie
Clark B. Allred
McKEACHNIE & ALLRED
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Attorneys for Respondents

Anna Hacha
920 S.W. 6th Ave.
Portland, Oregon 97204
Attorney for Utah Power &
Light Company

Russell C. Fericks
Robert G. Wright
John C. McKinley
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Mountain Fuel Supply Co.
Charles E. Greenhawt
Robert H. Lovell
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
180 East First South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84139
Attorneys for Mountain Fuel Supply Co.

14

nalysis of cases cited in 58 A.L.R. Second 525 (1958) and its supplements
X View that
Date of I
Date of |§4 View that
Date of I § 5 View
Date of I §7 View that
Date of I § 6 View
Dwer lines
power lines
most
most
power lines
most
that power
that power
most
most
re ipso facto
are ipso facto recent case
are within
recent
recent
lines are
lines are
recent
recent
ithin street
cited
case cited street or
case cited within street case cited within street case cited beyond street
r highway
supporting
supporting highway
supporting or highway
supporting or highway
supporting or highway
asement easement easement
this
|
this
easement
this
easement
this
this
urisdictions
position
position where they
position where street
position when street
position Jurisdictions
furnish
or highway is
or highway is
power for
in urban area
in urban area
use directly
and lines
related to
furnish
Jurisdictions
travel power for
Jurisdictions
use directly
related, to
travel (Jurisdictions
Oth Cir.
\labama
ndiana
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<entucky
^asachusetts
^Jew Mexico
Dklahoma
South Carolina
Utah
Washington
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1942
1930
1940
1950
1929
1943
1968
1971
1936
1980
1947
1923

California
Illinois
Iowa
Maryland
Michigan
Mississippi
New Jersey
New York
Rhode Island
Tennessee
Wisconsin

Average
1947
(Cases after 1970 are highlighted)

1911
1902
1898
1949
1892
1954
1949
1912
1890
1945
1900

1918

Arkansas
Illinois
Pennsylvania

1956
1902
1954

1937

Ohio

1921

1921

Georgia
Louisiana
Nebraska
North Carolina
J
Texas

1932
1955
1903
1905
1948

1929

lalysis of cases cited in Exhibit "A" to Appellant's Brief.
iew 1
ilities add
burden) risdictions

Date of
I [View 2
(utilities add
most
burden if not
recent
case cited related to
supporting road use) Jurisdictions
this
position

aska
abama
aho
diana
ansas
sntucky
asachusetts
ichigan
ontana
ew Hampshire
ew Mexico
klahoma
outh Carolina
tah
Washington

1983
1930
1983
1989
1950
1929
1943
1986
1972
1985
1987
1971
1936
1980
1947

test Virginia

1923

Date of
I View 3
(utilities add
most
burden if in
recent
case cited rural area) supporting Jurisdictions
this
position

California
Illinois
Iowa
Maryland
Mississippi *
New Jersey
New York
Rhode Island
Tennessee
Wisconsin

1911
1902
1898
1972
1954
1949
1912
1890
1945
1900

*But see Davis v. So.
Central Bell Tel. Co.,
480 F. Supp. 826
(S.D. Miss. 1984)
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verage for
iew 1
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1935

Arkansas

Date of
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supporting
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1972

I Date of
I View 4
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burden unless recent
urban area
case cited
and related
supporting
to road use) - this
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Ohio

1921

I View 5
(utilities add
burden)Jurisdictions

Date of
|
most
recent case
cited
supporting
this
position

1975
1987
1990
1903
1905
1948

Georgia
Connecticut
Louisiana
Nebraska
North Carolina
Texas **

** But see Lohmann v.
Gulf Refining Co., 682
S.W.2d612 (Tex. App.
1984)
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